Quantum key distribution (QKD) involving polarized photons could be vulnerable to a jamming attack, in which a third party applies an external magnetic field to rotate the plane of polarization of photons headed toward one of the two intended recipients. Sufficiently large Faraday rotation of one of the polarized beams would prevent Alice and Bob from establishing a secure quantum channel. We investigate requirements to induce such rotation both for free-space transmission and for transmission via optical fiber, and find reasonable ranges of parameters in which a jamming attack could be successful against fiber-based QKD, even for systems that implement automated recalibration for polarization-frame alignment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable technologies associated with quantum entanglement is quantum encryption [1] [2] [3] [4] . In the popular Ekert91 protocol [5] , a source creates pairs of entangled particles; one member of each pair goes to Alice and Bob, respectively. By performing measurements at their respective stations on a series of entangled particles and sharing some information on a classical channel about their choices of measurement bases (but not sharing their measurement outcomes), Alice and Bob can establish a quantum key with which to encrypt and share messages. They can further establish the security of their quantum channel by subjecting a subset of their entangled particles to a Bell test, by measuring (for example) the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt parameter S [6] .
In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has advanced to robust, in-the-field demonstrations. Secure quantum keys have been distributed using photons through optical fibers as well as via free-space transmission. Perhaps the most dramatic demonstrations to date have involved quantum key distribution across thousands of kilometers using the Micius satellite, launched by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2016 and now in low-Earth orbit at an average altitude of 500 km [7] [8] [9] . Shorter-distance quantum key distribution is typically accomplished via networks of optical fibers, over distances ranging from a few kilometers to hundreds of kilometers [10] .
In principle, the security of QKD derives from fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, such as entanglement, the uncertainty principle, and the no-cloning theorem [1] [2] [3] [4] . In practice, physicists and engineers have identified a series of potential vulnerabilities that could enable an adversary either to eavesdrop on a quantum channel and gain information not intended for them, or * daschner@mit.edu † dikaiser@mit.edu ‡ josephf@mit.edu to jam a quantum channel [2, 3, [11] [12] [13] [14] . In a jamming (or denial-of-service) attack, the intended recipients would not be able to verify the security of the quantum channel and hence would refrain from using it to communicate. Whereas the eavesdropping attacks that have been identified to date typically require rather sophisticated instrumentation and analysis, jamming attacks tend to be more straightforward [3] . For example, by shining a bright, classical light source toward Alice's or Bob's photon detectors, an adversary could saturate at least one of their detectors; then Alice and Bob would not be able to reliably measure the intended (QKD) photons in order to establish a secure quantum key. (Such "blinding" attacks can lead to further vulnerabilities; cf. Refs. [15, 16] .)
In this paper we consider a different way that an adversary could jam QKD. Our approach identifies a potential vulnerability for QKD systems that use polarized photons. By applying an external magnetic field to some limited region of space through which the photons intended for Alice (or Bob) must pass, an adversary could induce a rotation of the photons' polarization via the Faraday effect. A sufficiently strong magnetic field would reduce the degree of Bell violation that Alice and Bob would measure, to the point that they would not be able to verify that they shared a trustworthy quantum channel. Hence they would not be able to establish a secure quantum key. The same type of jamming attack would be effective against other QKD protocols involving polarized photons, such as variants of the BB84 protocol [17] , which do not involve explicit Bell-CHSH measurements, since the Faraday rotation would increase the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
In Section II, we briefly derive the effect that a rotation of the plane of polarization of one of the polarized photon beams would have on Alice's and Bob's measurement of the CHSH parameter S, from which we may evaluate the magnitude of a rotation angle α required for a jamming attack. In Section III we consider applications of such a jamming attack to free-space QKD and for distribution within optical fiber. As we will see, the scenario we describe would not likely be effective against free-space QKD involving polarized photons, but could arXiv:1905.01359v1 [quant-ph] 3 May 2019 have a significant impact on systems that depend upon optical fiber. Concluding remarks follow in Section IV.
II. BEAM ROTATION AND BELL TESTS
In order to confirm the security of a quantum channel, Alice and Bob may perform a Bell test, using a portion of the entangled photons that have been distributed from the source. We assume that the source emits pairs of polarization-entangled photons in a maximally entangled state such as |Φ ± = {|H A ⊗ |H B ± |V A ⊗ |V B }/ √ 2, where subscripts A, B indicate photons directed toward Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice and Bob can each measure polarization in one of two bases, represented by the spatial unit vectors a and a for Alice and b and b for Bob; we label their measurement outcomes A, B ∈ {+1, −1}. Then p(A = B|a, b) is the conditional probability that Alice and Bob will obtain the same measurement outcome given the joint settings (a, b), in terms of which we may define the correlation function E(a, b) = 2p(A = B|a, b) − 1. The CHSH parameter S takes the form [6] 
Measurements on particles that are not entangled obey the Bell-CHSH inequality, S ≤ 2, whereas measurements on entangled particles may yield S > 2 [6] . In particular, the maximum violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality consistent with quantum mechanics is the Tsirelson bound, S max = 2 √ 2 [18] . For measurements of polarized photons in the state |Φ ± , quantum mechanics predicts that the correlation functions should behave as E(a, b) → cos(2θ ab ), where cos θ ab ≡ a · b. If we assume that the entangled photons travel along z and Alice and Bob measure their polarizations within the x − y plane, then the Tsirelson bound corresponds to the choice of bases (a, a ) = (0
. If Alice or Bob measure their photons in some rotated basis, then the value of S that they measure will decrease from its maximum value. Consider the case in which Alice measures her photons in a basis rotated by an angle
Then it is straightforward to demonstrate that the Bell-CHSH violation for the state |Φ ± measured in the bases (ã,ã ) and (b, b ) will shift to S →S, with
The same shift S →S will result if we keep Alice's measurement bases (a, a ) unchanged but rotate the plane of polarization of the photons directed towards her by an angle α. In that case |H A → |H A = cos α|H A + sin α|V A and |V A → |Ṽ A = − sin α|H A + cos α|V A , and the entangled state shifts to |Φ
the quantum-mechanical correlation function behaves as E(a, b) = − cos(2θ ab ), we again find the predicted shift in the CHSH parameter as given in Eq. (2).
In a real test, Alice and Bob will typically measure a value 2 < S meas < 2 √ 2. The visibility fraction S meas /2 √ 2 will fall below one due to imperfections in the state preparation, such that the photons that Alice and Bob receive are not in a maximally entangled state; misalignments of the bases from the ideal settings; finiteaperture effects; limited detector efficiencies, and so on [19] . Nonetheless, Alice and Bob can have confidence in the security of their quantum channel if their measured value S meas ± σ (taking into account systematic errors, quantified by the standard deviation σ) exceeds the Bell-CHSH limit of 2 to high statistical significance.
If -unbeknownst to Alice -the polarization of her photons has been rotated by a sufficiently large angle α en route to her, after their emission from the source, then she and Bob will not be able to verify with sufficient confidence that they share a secure quantum channel. We make the conservative assumption that the rotation of the polarization of Alice's photons does not increase the systematic errors σ for Alice's and Bob's measurements of S, since nothing has been done to affect the instrumentation at either receiving station: both sides still operate with the same detector efficiencies, dark count rates, and the like. If we further assume that Alice and Bob perform measurements on a sufficiently large sample of photons that they may assume Gaussian statistics, then the effect of the rotated polarization will be to shift the distribution of values S meas that they are likely to find, with a mean value closer to the Bell-CHSH limit of S = 2, as shown in Fig. 1 Normalized probability density functions f (Smeas|µ, σ 2 ) for expected values to be measured of the CHSH parameter S, assuming Gaussian statistics (with mean µ and standard deviation σ). A rotation of the polarization of the photons directed toward Alice will shift the mean measured value of S toward lower values. In this case, a rotation of the polarization of Alice's photons by α = 12.4
• shifts the measured value Smeas = 2.37 ± 0.09 (blue curve) toSmeas = 2.15 ± 0.09 (orange curve). Also shown are the Bell-CHSH values S = 2 and the Tsirelson bound S = 2 √ 2. Because the correlation functions E(a, b) satisfy |E(a, b)| ≤ 1, the maximum (algebraic) value for S is 4.
In Fig. 1 we illustrate the effects of an induced shift S meas →S meas . In a recent experimental test of the Bell-CHSH inequality using polarization-entangled photons from the satellite Micius, receiving stations on the ground measured S meas = 2.37 ± 0.09 [20] . If the polarization of Alice's photons had been rotated by α = 0.216 rad = 12.4
• en route, while all other details of the experimental test remained unchanged, then from Eq. (2) we would expect a shift S meas →S meas = 2.15 ± 0.09. In that case, what had originally been a violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality by more than 4 standard deviations would be reduced to a violation by just 1.7 standard deviations. Assuming Gaussian statistics, this would correspond to a shift in the probability with which Alice and Bob would conclude that their quantum channel was insecure from p = 2.0 × 10 −5 to p = 0.05. Given such a relatively large p value in the latter case, Alice and Bob would not be justified in trusting their quantum channel.
For other QKD protocols involving polarized photons, such as the BB84 protocol and its variants [17] , Alice and Bob need not explicitly perform a Bell-CHSH test. Nonetheless, such protocols would also be affected if, for some reason, the plane of polarization of the photons headed toward Alice were rotated by an angle α. In particular, such rotation would increase the quantum bit error rate (QBER), potentially endangering the ability of Alice and Bob to establish a secure quantum channel. In this case, a photon in a particular quantum state, such as |H A , would be misidentified by Alice's detector as being |V A a fraction (1 − cos 2 α) of times (and likewise |Ṽ A for |H A ). The additional QBER would be about 7.6% for α = 0.279 rad = 16.0
• . Given typical QBER for QKD systems under nominal operating conditions of 2 − 3% [14, 21, 22] , the additional error rate induced by the rotation angle α would push the total QBER too high for reliable use.
III. JAMMING QKD SYSTEMS
How might an adversary (whom we designate "Janice") jam Alice's and Bob's attempts to establish a secure quantum channel, without alerting Alice or Bob to her presence? If Janice could surreptitiously rotate the plane of polarization of the photons heading toward Alice by a large enough angle α, then she could jam Alice's and Bob's quantum channel, without in any way affecting Alice's or Bob's instrumentation (unlike other jamming attacks, such as saturating Alice's detector with a classical light source, which is readily detectable [3, 23] ). To accomplish such an attack, Janice could exploit Faraday rotation.
Faraday rotation arises when an external magnetic field is applied along the direction of propagation of polarized light as the light travels through a dielectric medium; under such circumstances, the plane of polarization of the light will rotate by an angle β. For light propagating a distance L through a uniform medium in which a constant external field of strength B 0 is applied, the rotation angle β is given by [24] 
where V, the Verdet constant, depends on properties of the medium as well as the wavelength of the light. The Verdet constant may be parameterized as [24] 
where n is the index of refraction for the medium (in the absence of the external magnetic field), c is the speed of light in vacuum, 0 is the vacuum permittivity, e is the (absolute value of the) unit charge of an electron, ρ is the number density of electrons within the medium, and λ is the wavelength of the propagating light. (Note that the index of refraction n also varies weakly with λ.) As usual, we may evaluate the electron number density as
where N A is Avogadro's number, f i is the fractional composition of the medium by constituent type i, y i is the number of electrons per atom or molecule of constituent type i, µ i is the mass density (in g m −3 ) of constituent i, and m i is the molecular mass (in g mol −1 ) for constituent i. For example, the Earth's atmosphere near sea level is largely composed of N 2 (f = 0.781), O 2 (f = 0.210), and Ar (f = 0.01), for which we find ρ = 3.7 × 10 26 m −3 . Polarized photons traveling through the Earth's atmosphere will undergo a weak rotation, due to the Earth's magnetic field. Given the varying density of the atmosphere, one may effectively neglect such effects for altitudes L > 4×10 4 m above sea level, and model the atmosphere as a uniform medium with fixed electron number density ρ 3.7 × 10 26 m −3 for 0 ≤ L ≤ 4 × 10 4 m [25] . The Earth's magnetic field strength is also (roughly) uniform across those altitudes, with B 0 5 × 10 −5 T. For photons of wavelength λ = 850 nm, the index of refraction in air (at standard temperature and pressure) is (n − 1) = 2.7477 × 10 −4 [26] . Hence for the propagation of polarized photons with λ = 850 nm from space to ground [20] , we find V air 3.7 × 10 −4 rad T −1 m −1 and β 7.4 × 10 −4 rad 0.042 • , in close agreement with the results for β/B 0 calculated in Ref. [25] . Clearly the Faraday effect arising from the Earth's own magnetic field poses no threat to successful QKD involving free-space transmission of polarized photons, including space-to-ground transmission.
For Janice to exploit the Faraday effect to jam QKD from free-space transmission of polarized photons, she would need to apply an external magnetic field considerably stronger than the Earth's field. In order to produce a rotation β ≥ α by means of the Faraday effect, Janice would need to establish
We found in Section II that for distribution of polarizaton-entangled photons as in Ref. [20] , rotation by an angle α = 0.216 rad = 12.4
• could effectively jam Alice's and Bob's efforts to establish a secure quantum channel. For such free-space propagation, using V air = 3.7 × 10 −4 rad T −1 m −1 , achieving a minimum rotation angle α = 0.216 rad would require (B 0 L) min = 594.6 T m.
To date, the highest continuous magnetic field strength produced by Earthbound instrumentation is B 0 = 45 T, achieved using a hybrid superconducting and resistivematerials magnet weighing 35 tons and measuring 6.7m high [27] . Presumably Janice could not install such instrumentation somewhere along the path of Alice's photons without revealing her scheme. More typical field strengths, with B 0 ∼ O(1) T, are produced by tiny and inexpensive objects, such as coin-sized neodymium-ironboron rare-earth magnets [28, 29] . In this case, the challenge for Janice would be to suspend an array of such magnets over a considerable distance (∼ 0.5 km) along the path of Alice's photons. It therefore seems that QKD involving free-space transmission of polarized photonsincluding transmission from low-Earth orbit to ground stations -is not in jeopardy of being jammed via induced Faraday rotation.
On the other hand, most QKD systems in practice will likely depend upon propagation through optical fiber to connect networks within and between metropolitan areas, ranging over distances from O(10 0 − 10 2 ) km [10, 14, 21, 30] . Empirical measurements of the effective Verdet constant for typical, commercial optical fiber for wavelengths ranging across the visible bands into the near infrared may be parameterized as V fiber = a × 10 −28 ν 2 rad T −1 m −1 , with ν = c/λ the frequency of light in Hz. Two sets of measurements found a = 0.159 ± 0.008 [31] and a = 0.142 ± 0.004 [32] . QKD via optical fiber typically uses photons with λ = 1550 nm [21, [33] [34] [35] ; adopting the lower (more conservative) measurement of V from Ref. [32] , this corresponds to V fiber = 0.53 rad T −1 m −1 . (We find a comparable estimate for V fiber if we use Eq. (4), naively assume pure silicon dioxide for the core of the fiber, and take n = 1.44 for λ = 1550 nm within the fiber core.)
Given that the Verdet constant is three orders of magnitude greater for optical fiber than for the atmosphere, Janice's jamming attack based on Faraday rotation can be significantly more effective against QKD via optical fiber. In fact, the authors of Ref. [33] found a weak but measurable effect on fiber-based QKD involving polarized photons arising simply from Faraday rotation from the Earth's weak magnetic field. If Janice were to apply a stronger external field B 0 , she could achieve a sufficient rotation angle α to disrupt Alice's and Bob's quantum channel for
In Tables I and II we show the requirements for Janice's jamming attack based on Bell-CHSH tests involving propagation of polarized photons with λ 1550 nm through optical fiber, both for table-top experiments (across a distance d = 0 km) and for long-distance propagation through fiber (across d = 20 km). As in Section II, we assume that the Faraday rotation would not affect the systematic errors reported in the original experiments, and hence we calculate the shift S meas ± σ →S meas ± σ, withS meas related to S meas by Eq. (2). We consider scenarios in which Alice and Bob stop trusting the security of their quantum channel if they measure only modest violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality: either a violation by only 1.7 standard deviations (corresponding to a probability that they were not measuring entangled particles of p = 0.05); or the more stringent threshold of 2.5 standard deviations (corresponding to p = 0.006). Each scenario corresponds to a different minimum rotation angle α, and hence, via Eq. (6), to a different value of (B 0 L) min . The limiting case would be if Alice and Bob could achieve S meas = 2 √ 2 with vanishing systematic error. In that case, Janice would need to rotate the plane of polarization of Alice's photons by α = 0.39 rad = 22.5 Tables  I and II , with 0.09 ≤ (B 0 L) min ≤ 0.58, such a rotation could be readily achieved by Janice using a small number of inexpensive, coin-sized neodymium-iron-boron magnets arranged within a region of space just a few centimeters across.
In real implementations of QKD via optical fiber, transmission has been shown to remain stable over timescales of 1 -2 hours [21, 22] . Nonetheless, recalibration mechanisms must be employed, because tiny mechanical or thermal disturbances to the fiber can lead to significant induced birefringence, which in turn can push the polarization bases out of alignment. Typically the recalibration consists of sending (unentangled) photons of known polarization to Alice and/or Bob, who can then adjust compensating wave plates at their detector stations to realign the polarization bases. Polarization realignment can now be implemented automatically, triggered (for example) by a rise in QBER, and typically requires ∼ 5 s [22] . Other active polarization-control methods -which constantly monitor and adjust alignment rather than being triggered by a rise in QBER -have been able to compensate for rapid changes in polarization basis with scrambling frequencies up to 40π rad s −1 [36, 37] . If Janice simply placed her magnets near the optical fiber that directed photons toward Alice's detectors and left them there, then Alice and Bob could re-establish a secure quantum channel by recalibrating their polarization bases; indeed, Alice and Bob probably would not even suspect that Janice had tried to jam their channel. However, if Janice moved her magnets in some pattern near the relevant optical fiber -thereby changing the applied external field over a time-scale shorter than the time required to complete a polarization realignment -then she could succeed in interrupting Alice's and Bob's quantum channel indefinitely. For the automated trigger-based realignment system of Ref. [22] , Janice would need to shift her applied field on timescales shorter than 5 s; for the continuous-adjustment schemes described in Refs. [36, 37] , Janice would need to shift her applied field on time-scales shorter than ∼ 0.3 rad/(40π rad s −1 ) = 0.002 s.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have identified a potential vulnerability of quantum key distribution (QKD) using polarized photons. In particular, an adversary (whom we dub Janice) could induce a rotation of the plane of polarization of the light headed toward Alice (or Bob) by applying a strong external magnetic field across a region of space through which the photons traveled. The induced Faraday rotation would prevent Alice and Bob from establishing a secure quantum channel, either by lowering the measured value of the Bell-CHSH parameter S with which they would certify the security of their channel (as in the Ekert91 protocol [5] ), or, more generally, by increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER) above acceptable levels. Such a jamming attack would not enable Janice to gain secret information (as in eavesdropping attacks), though it would enable her to disrupt Alice's and Bob's channel indefinitely, without requiring access to either Alice's or Bob's instrumentation, or even revealing her presence.
The magnitude of the Faraday effect depends sensitively on the medium through which the photons propagate. We find that such a jamming attack would likely not be effective against free-space transmission of the polarized photons (including space-based QKD as in Ref. [7] [8] [9] ), though it could be more readily effective against QKD systems that depend upon transmission of polarized photons through optical fiber. In particular, given the sensitivity of optical fiber to mechanical disturbances, installations of QKD fiber networks will likely shield against direct mechanical interference, which could impede Janice's ability to intervene surreptitiously with the fibers (for example, by blocking or cutting them). Given cost considerations, however, it is unlikely that tens or even hundreds of kilometers of optical fiber for QKD will be protected by robust magnetic shielding. Hence Janice could implement her jamming attack without gaining direct, physical access to the fibers, while remaining far away from either Alice's or Bob's receiving stations.
Given the easy availability of inexpensive rare-earth, coin-sized magnets with field strengths B 0 ∼ O(1) T (available at local hardware stores), Janice's jamming attack could be both inexpensive and inconspicuous. A few such magnets arranged across a few centimeters (concealed, say, within a backpack) and placed near an unguarded stretch of optical fiber could disrupt Alice's and Bob's quantum channel. A simple mechanical construction within the backpack, which would rearrange the magnets in space on an appropriately short time-scale and thereby shift the direction and strength of the applied field in an unpredictable pattern, could spoil Alice's and Bob's efforts to reestablish a secure channel via polarization realignment or recalibration.
The jamming attack we have identified here targets QKD involving polarized photons. Whether comparable attacks could be effective against other popular QKD protocols involving photons, such as time-energy entanglement, remains the subject of further research.
